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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust (Michael Robert Barker, Trustee) appeals 
from the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered March 8, 2010 
herein, finding that Plaintiff has no easement, right-of-way, or means of access between a 
landlocked parcel of real property located in Kane County, State of Utah, and an adjacent 
public road (Appendix at Attachment 1); further, from the court's entry of judgment 
based on its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered April 21, 2010 (Appendix 
at Attachment 2); finally, from the court's denial of Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial, 
dated January 1, 2011 (Appendix at Attachment 3). Plaintiff?Appellant's Notice of 
Appeal was filed with the trial court on January 4, 2011 (Appendix at Attachment 4), but 
contained a typographical error; and Amended Notice of Appeal was filed January 24, 
2011 (Appendix at Attachment 5). 
The trial court's Findings and Conclusions, Judgment and Order Denying Motion 
for New Trial all followed a bench trial in this matter on January 26, 2010. Therein, 
Plaintiff contended that its property, isolated from the adjacent county road by numerous 
parcels of real property once held in unity of title by a common grantor, was entitled to a 
declaration of easement by necessity. In the alternative, Plaintiff sought an order of the 
court reforming deeds to adjacent properties to reflect an express easement thereon. 
During trial, Plaintiff established by unrefuted evidence that its property, as well as those 
lying between that property and the adjacent county road, had once been held in unity of 
title by common grantors; further, that an easement by necessity was necessary in order 
973171.1 
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to afford Plaintiff reasonable access to its property from the adjacent county road. 
Testimony was conflicting concerning whether there existed an alternate physical means 
of access between Plaintiffs property and the adjacent county road; it was undisputed, 
though, that no legal right-of-way existed, thus necessitating trespass by Plaintiff for 
access. The only evidence concerning a legal right-of-way came in the form of a 
reservation of right-of-way on a separate deed, reserving an easement across the southern 
portion of the property conveyed; however, no evidence of any conveyance of that 
reserved right-of-way to Plaintiff or its predecessors-in-interest was presented to the trial 
court. 
Nevertheless, the trial court found that (1) Plaintiff had failed to establish a case 
for easement by necessity, in that it produced no living witness able to testify that, at the 
moment of severance, the easement by necessity was obvious and in existence. The court 
further found that, in conveying title to an adjacent parcel of property subject to a 
reservation of easement, Plaintiffs remote grantors "intended" to grant an easement in 
favor of Plaintiff s predecessors-in-interest to its property. The court concluded, 
however, that Plaintiff had failed to produce competent evidence establishing its remote 
grantors' intent to place the reservation of easement on Plaintiffs property (and those 
properties lying between Plaintiffs property and the adjacent county road), disregarding 
completely the fact that (1) the reservation of easement on the adjacent property was 
nonsensical in that that parcel flanks the county road on its eastern border and requires no 
easement or right-of-way to the adjacent county road; and (2) by placing the reservation 
973171.1 
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of easement on the adjacent property, Plaintiffs remote grantors landlocked Plaintiffs 
property. 
In fact, the trial court's ruling impermissibly and improperly leaves Plaintiffs 
property without access to or from the outside world, either through reformation of 
necessary instruments of conveyance to recognize the intent and preservation of an 
express easement, or through the imposition of easement by necessity. It is clearly 
against the policy of the law to leave real property without any reasonable means of 
access to the outside world, thus rendering it unusable. 
Upon entry of final judgment by the trial court on Wednesday, April 21, 2010, 
Plaintiff prepared and filed a Motion for New Trial under Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P., which 
motion was filed and served Monday, May 3, 2010. Briefing was completed by May 17, 
2010, and the matter submitted on May 19, 2010. The court scheduled no hearing until 
November 4, 2010. Thereafter, on January 3, 2011, the court issued an order denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial as having been untimely filed (Appendix at Attachment 
3). In fact, the motion was timely filed under any interpretation of Rule 6, Utah R. 
Civ. P., and should have been considered on its face; moreover, this denial for the reasons 
articulated by the trial court should not be deemed to make Plaintiffs appeal to this Court 
untimely. 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR APPEAL 
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of the Sixth Judicial District 
Court for Kane County, State of Utah, denying Plaintiffs request for easement rights 
<mi7i 1 
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across Defendants' property to the adjacent county road. Appeal was initially taken to 
the Supreme Court for the State of Utah, which thereafter assigned the matter to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1, Whether the trial court erred in holding that Plaintiff's Motion for New 
Trial was untimely under Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P., even though (1) Judgment was entered 
Wednesday, April 21, 2010; (2) Plaintiff filed its Motion for New Trial on Monday, May 
3, 2010; and (3) Rule 6, Utah R. Civ. P. provides that (a) when a filing period is less than 
11 days, intervening Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded from the 
computation, and (b) when the last day of a period falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal 
holiday, the period is extended to the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal 
holiday. This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness - Burgers v. Maiben, 652 
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
2, Whether the trial court erred in failing to find the existence of an easement 
by necessity between Plaintiff's property, located in Kane County, Utah, and an adjacent 
public right-of-way. The Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed for clear error; its 
interpretation and application of the law of easements by necessity is reviewed for 
correctness. Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 
2005UT22, 112P.3d495. 
3, Whether the trial court erred in finding an "intent" on the part of Plaintiff's 
remote grantors (who did not testify at trial) to grant to Plaintiff's predecessors in interest 
4 
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an express easement for access to and from Plaintiff's property along an adjacent 
property. The Court's Findings, Conclusions and Judgment are reviewed for clear error. 
Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 
112P.3d495. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to reform the warranty deed dated 
August 12,1985, from Idona J. Smith to Paul R. Harris and Gina L. Harris, recorded at 
Entry 55612, Book 86, Pages 454-455, Office of the County Recorder for Kane County, 
State of Utah, as well as the warranty deed dated April 16, 2001, from Paul R. Harris and 
Gina L. Harris to James M. Park and Tori L. Park, recorded as Entry No. 205769, Book 
207, Page 32, Office of the County Recorder for Kane County, State of Utah (Appendix 
at Attachment 13) to reflect an express easement thereon. The court's Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment in this regard are reviewed for clear error - Cowley v. Porter, 
2005 UT App. 518, 127 P.3d 1224; Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 112 P.3d 495. 
CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
1. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1. 
2. Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 
3. Rule 59(b), Utah R. Civ. P. 
4. Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 90, 54 P.3d 1153. 
5. Panos v. Olsen & Associates Construction, Inc., 2005 UT App. 446, 123 
P.3d816. 
6. Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 277 
(Utah 1976). 
5 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust is the owner of a parcel of real property in 
Kane County, State of Utah, situated to the east of County Road K-2000, and inaccessible 
from any adjacent public right-of-way. Plaintiff filed this action on April 3, 2006 (R. 1-
11) seeking a declaration of easement and right-of-way across two parcels of real 
property lying between Plaintiffs property and the adjacent public road, which properties 
belong, respectively, to James M. Park and Tori L. Park, and to Dennis Carr and Donette 
Carr. 
On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff moved the court for summary judgment (R. 35-37). 
In response, Defendants Dennis and Donette Carr stipulated to a decree of quiet title, 
granting to Plaintiff an express easement across their property (R. 83-86). Based on the 
parties' stipulation and motion, the court entered an order of quiet title and dismissal with 
respect to the Carr Defendants on October 6, 2006 (R. 149-152). Defendants James M. 
Park and Tori L. Park, however, resisted Plaintiffs motion. By Memorandum Decision 
dated November 28, 2006 (R. 156-163), the trial court expressly found the fundamental 
facts underlying Plaintiffs claim of easement by necessity; the trial court concluded, 
however, that Plaintiff had failed to establish, as a matter of law, that access across the 
Parks Defendants' property was "reasonably necessary" to the use and enjoyment of 
Plaintiff s property. 
On February 23, 2007, Plaintiff renewed its motion for summary judgment, 
submitting additional evidence concerning the reasonable necessity of easement rights 
<mi7i i 
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between its property and the adjacent county road (R. 164-166). The Park Defendants 
responded with their own motion for summary judgment (R. 253-255), even though the 
Park motion had been untimely filed under the court's scheduling order (R. 66-69). 
Given the parties' respective contentions concerning the physical access problems to the 
properties at issue, Plaintiff also moved the Court to conduct a site view (R. 238-240) 
The court scheduled argument of both motions for November 2, 2007 (R. 392-394). On 
January 14, 2008, the court issued its decision, again holding that a question of fact 
existed concerning the "reasonable necessity" of Plaintiff s proposed easement across the 
Park Defendants' property, yet declining a site view (R. 400-405). 
This matter was tried to the court on January 26, 2010 (R. 625-626). Following a 
presentation of evidence and argument of counsel, the court took the matter under 
advisement. 
On March 8, 2010, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. 627-639; Appendix at Attachment 1). In its Findings, the Court acknowledged the 
following: 
a. That, prior to August 1, 1964, Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith 
owned the properties identified in the evidence (and below in the 
Statement of Facts) as the North Property, the Watson Property, the 
Trust Property, the Carr Property and the Park Property as a single 
parcel (Findings of Fact at ^ 3); 
b. That the single parcel had been accessed via a county road which 
bordered the parcel and past through portions thereof (Findings of 
Fact No. 4); 
c. That, on August 1, 1964, the Smiths conveyed a portion of the 
parcel, and retained the balance (Findings of Fact at Yf 5 and 6); 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
d. That a portion of the Smith's property conveyed to RKR was 
thereafter divided among Grantees B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson 
and Oliver D. LeFevre, who in turn partitioned the Watson Property, 
the Trust Property and the Carr Property (granting each other 
reciprocal easement rights for access thereto) (Findings of Fact at fflf 
7-13); 
e. That the Park Property was retained by Smiths, and conveyed by 
Paul and Gina Harris to Defendants in 2001 (Findings of Fact at ^ 
15). 
At paragraph 18, the Court summarized all testimony offered by Defendant at trial 
concerning physical means of access between the Trust Property and the adjacent county 
road; at no point, however, did the Court find that any alternate access route between the 
Trust Property and the county road (whether physically passable or not) did not constitute 
trespass over private lands owned by non-parties to the lawsuit. 
At Conclusion of Law No. 4, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had not established 
a right to easement by necessity based on the following: 
a. "No witness testified as to conditions existent on August 1, 1964; the 
date of severance; 
i 
b. "The Court is unaware as to whether there was a road from the Trust 
Property to the outer world as of August 1, 1964; 
c. "Presumably no witness with knowledge or other evidence was 
available to the trust regarding the conditions on the ground 45 years 
ago; at the time the Smiths' severed the Park property from the 
property it sold to RKR; 
d. "The Court thus cannot make a finding as to whether the 80-acre 
parcel originally conveyed to RKR (of which the Trust Property is a 
part) was land locked at the time of severance; 
e. "Because the trust is the plaintiff in this action it bears the burden of 
proof; 
O T i n i 1 
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f. "In the absence of such evidence this court is required to rule in 
favor of the Parks on that issue; 
g. "Under Utah law an easement by necessity is not created 'clearly 
appears that the parties to the conveyance did not intend such an 
easement.' [citing governing case law, more fully addressed below]; 
h. "In this case Deed ; B' contained a grant of a 30-foot easement from 
the county road across the 240-acre RKR parcel to the northwest 
corner of the parcel conveyed in Deed CB'; 
i. "Because at the time of severance there were two deeds from the 
Smiths to RKR (Deed 'A' and Deed 'B') rather than just one; and 
because the land in Deed ;B' was on the same day subsequently 
conveyed to the three individuals (B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson 
and Oliver D. LeFevre); and because the 30-foot easement granted in 
Deed 'B' went to the northwest comer of the property conveyed in 
Deed 'B' , Deed 'B' evidences clear intent on the part of the parties 
to the severance that the express easement granted in deed 'B5 was 
the intended means of access to the 80-acre parcel conveyed in Deed 
6 B\" 
(Conclusion of Law No. 4). 
Judgment was thereafter entered on Wednesday, April 21, 2010 (R. 647-650; 
Appendix at Attachment 2). On Monday, May 3, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion and 
Memorandum for New Trial (R. 651-719). Following briefing, Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Request for Ruling on May 21, 2010 (R. 734-736), and again on September 9, 2010 
(R. 737). The court scheduled the matter for oral argument on November 4, 2010 
(R. 738); thereafter on January 3, 2011, the court denied Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial 
as having been filed untimely (R. 739-741). 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2011 (R. 742-743; Appendix at 
Attachment 4); it amended its notice of appeal on January 26, 2011 (R. 744-746; 
Appendix at Attachment 5). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
A. Facts Admitted Prior to Trial. 
Prior to trial, and pursuant to dispositive motions filed by Plaintiff as well as facts 
admitted in discovery (all as presented at trial - see TR at 22-24), the following facts 
were established as uncontroverted: 
1. Plaintiff owns a parcel of land located in Kane County, Utah. Hereinafter, 
this property is referred to as 'the Trust Property.5 
2. Defendants Dennis Carr and Donette Carr ("the Carrs") also own a parcel 
of land located in Kane County, Utah. This property is referred to as 'the Carr Property.' 
3. Defendants James M. Park and Tori L. Park ("the Parks55) are owners of a 
parcel of land located in Kane County, Utah. This property is referred to as 'the Park 
Property.5 
4. The Trust Property, the Carr Property, and the Park Property form three 
contiguous parcels of land located to the west of Kane County Road No. K-2000 
('County Road5): 
a. The Park Property is immediately adjacent to the County Road. 
b. The Carr Property is located to the west of the Park Property. 
c. The Trust Property is located to the west of the Carr and the Park 
Properties. 
1
 References to pages of the trial transcript (R. 747) appear as "TR at 5\ Trial exhibits 
were numbered sequentially without distinction as to their receipt from plaintiff or 
defendant, and are indicated as "Exh. 5\ 
10 
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The layout of the three properties vis-a-vis each other and the USGS map of the region 
was illustrated on Exhibits 1-3 (TR at 30-35). Copies of Exhs. 1-3 are included in the 
Appendix at Attachments 6-8. 
5. Prior to August 1, 1964, the Trust, the Carr, and the Park Properties were all 
owned in fee simple by Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith ('the Smiths'). 
6. Later, the Properties were conveyed to other owners. There were a number 
of transfers over the years. 
7. Plaintiff became the owner of the Trust Property on August 2, 2006. 
8. On December 21, 1965, the then-owners of the Carr Property conveyed an 
easement across their property to the then-owners of the Trust Property. (See Right-of-
Way Deed between Gary Smith and Barbara G. Smith as grantors and Oliver D. LeFevre 
and Gary K. Watson as grantees.) 
B. Facts Adduced at Trial. 
At trial on January 26, 2010, testimony established the following additional facts: 
1. Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust is a trust organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah. Plaintiff is currently the holder of primary beneficial 
interest in and to the Trust Property, conveyed to the trust's creator, S. Mark Hulet, in 
exchange for professional services, and thereafter conveyed by mesne conveyances to the 
trust. TR at 26-28, 34-37, 44-48 and Exhs. 16-23. 
2. Prior to August 1, 1964, title in and to the Park Property, the Carr Property 
and the Trust Property (as well as a parcel to the west of the Trust Parcel later deeded to 
11 
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Mr. Gary K. Watson, hereafter "Watson Property") were held in fee simple interest 
absolute by Bertrand C. Smith and Idona J. Smith (hereafter "Smiths"). TR at 23. On 
that date, however, Smiths conveyed to RKR Construction Company all of their right, 
title and interest in and to the Trust Property, the Watson Property and the Carr Property 
by deed of that date, recorded February 13, 1965 as Entry No. 00396, Book 015, Page 
396, Kane County Recorder ("RKR Deed"). TR at 37-38 and Exh. 4. 
3. On the same date that the RKR Deed executed, Smiths conveyed to RKR 
Construction Company all of their right, title and interest in and to the parcel of land to 
the north of the Trust Property, the Watson Property and the Carr Property by deed 
recorded April 29, 1965 as Entry No. 00030, Book 016, Page 30, Kane County Recorder 
("RKR North Deed"). TR at 73-75 and Exh. 27. 
4. The RKR North Deed was made "subject to a 30 foot right-of-way from the 
Kane County Road to the NW corner of the N lA of the SW 1/4, Section 19, Township 38 
S, Range 8 W. Exh. 4. 
5. While, as drafted, the RKR North Deed is made subject to the described 
right-of-way, nothing in the RKR Deed (or in any subsequent conveyances of the 
property described therein) gives that property benefit of the right-of-way. Exhs. 4 and 
27. 
6. In reviewing the two deeds, the following facts are apparent from their face: 
a. Both deeds were prepared and signed on the same day, before the 
same notary; 
cm 171 i 
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b. The right-of-way is described from calls within the southwest 
quarter of Section 19 where the property deed by the RKR Deed is located, rather 
than from the northwest quarter of the section, where the property deeded by the 
RKR North Deed is located; 
c. Access over the southernmost 30 feet of the property described in 
the RKR North deed is impassible (see below); and 
d. The property described in the RKR Deed is not adjacent to County 
Road K-2000, is landlocked, and has need of a right-of-way to access the public 
road; the property described by the RKR North Deed, by contrast, is adjacent to 
the county road, and requires no access thereto. 
TR at 74-79 and Exhs. 4 and 27. 
7. By deed recorded January 10, 1965, RKR Construction Company conveyed 
all of its right, title and interest in and to the Carr Property, the Trust Property and the 
Watson Property to B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre, as tenants-in-
common of all three properties. TR at 39 and Exh. 5. 
8. The three transferees under this conveyance then quit claimed their 
respective interests in and to portions of the conveyed property, such that Oliver D. 
LeFevre became sole owner, in fee simple absolute, of the Trust Property; B. Gary Smith 
became sole owner, in fee simple absolute, of the Carr Property; and Gary K. Watson 
became sole owner, in fee simple absolute, of the Watson Property. TR at 40 and 
Exhs. 6-8. 
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9. Said transferees further conveyed to each other reciprocal easement rights 
over and across their respective parcels of property for the benefit of their neighboring 
landowners. TR at 41 and Exhs. 9-11. 
10. By stipulation, Plaintiff and the Carr Defendants have agreed that Plaintiff 
holds an express easement across the northernmost 30 feet of the Carr Property pursuant 
to Exh. 10, and this Court has entered an order and judgment quieting title in and to that 
easement in favor of Plaintiff ("Carr Property Easement"). R. 83-86, 149-152. 
11. As noted above, through mesne conveyances, the Trust succeeded to 
primary beneficial interest in and to the Trust Property by deed dated August 2, 2006 (TR 
at 43-48 and Exhs. 15-23), and the Carr Defendants succeeded to primary beneficial 
interest in and to the Carr Property - TR at 49-50 and Exh. 24. 
12. Defendant Donette Carr is daughter to Bud Allen, Carrs' grantor of the Carr 
Property under Quitclaim Deed dated April 6, 1998, recorded August 21, 1998 as Entry 
» * - " ' • • " ' . - • . , - * • . • - . . - • • ' " • " . • • " " * • • • » * • " 
No. 95443, Book 0176, Pages 682-683, Kane County Recorder. TR at 49, 102-103 and 
Exh. 24. 
13. In August of 1985, Idona J. Smith (then the sole surviving interest holder in 
and to the Park Property) conveyed all of her right, title and interest in and to the Park 
Property to Paul and Gina Harris. Said conveyance was by warranty deed dated 
August 12, 1985, and was recorded August 22, 1985 at Entry No. 55614, Book 086, 
Pages 454-455, Kane County Recorder ("Harris Deed"). TR at 42 and Exh. 12. 
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14. In 1970, Bud Allen (then owner of the Carr Property - see Paragraphs 19-
20, above)) purchased a 30-foot-wide easement and right-of-way from the Idona R. 
Smith, Bertrand Gary Smith, Luna Diane Smith Mitchell, Sylvia Karen Smith Bullock 
and lone J. Lambert (who at that time still held primary beneficial interest in and to the 
Park Property) across the northernmost thirty feet of the Park Property to its common 
border with the Carr Property. Said right-of-way was more particularly described as 
follows: 
Beginning at the center of Section 19, T38S, R8W, SLB&M, thence N 
89°43f E 1151.7 ft.; thence S 0°17' E 30.0 ft.; thence S 89°43f W 1151.7 
feet; thence N 0°17' W 30.0 ft. to the point of beginning and containing 
0.793 acres more or less. 
("Park Property Easement55). TR at 42 and Exh. 14. 
15. Mr. Allen's conveyance, however, was restricted to use by his family and 
invitees (including his daughter, Defendant Donette Carr - see Paragraph 12, above). 
Exh. 14. 
16. On April 16, 2001, Harrises conveyed their rights in and to the Park 
Property to James M. Park and Tori L. Park. Said conveyance was by warranty deed 
dated April 16, 2001, and was recorded April 25, 2001 at Entry No. 105769, Book 0207, 
Pages 32-33, Kane County Recorder ("Park Deed55). TR at 42, 100 and Exh. 13. 
17. The Park Property Easement is occupied by a graded dirt road providing 
physical access to the Park Property, the Carr Property, the Trust Property and the Watson 
Property. TR at 51-52, 101-103 and Exh. 25. The road is currently level and straight, 
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providing access across the Park Property to the Carr Property. Exh. 25 at pp. 0087-
0105. 
18. There was some dispute about when the road along the Park Property 
Easement was first installed, with Defendant James Park and witness John Eckert 
recalling its construction by Bud Allen in 1979-1980 (TR at 104, 144-145), and witness 
Donald Stucker remembering use of the road in the mid-1970s (TR at 118-119). It was 
undisputed, though, that the road needed to be built up due to the rutted, marshy quality 
of the ground surrounding it by virtue of natural springs. TR at 58-59, 122 and Exh. 25. 
19. Plaintiffs representative, S. Mark Hulet, testified - repeatedly and without 
objection - that he had searched the record of the Trust Property, the Park Property, the 
RKR Property, and adjacent properties, and had discovered no legal right of access to the 
Trust Property via the adjacent county road, existing at any time after Smith's conveyed 
away the Trust Property, the North Property, the Carr Property, and the Park Property. TR 
at 50, 62, 72-73, 82-83, 96. 
20. Trust representative Mark Hulet acknowledged on cross-examination, in 
fact, that in order to approach the Trust Properly on foot across the RKR Property to the 
north, he had been compelled to trespass. TRat96. 
21. Defendants produced no evidence whatever controverting the lack of legal 
access to and from the Trust Property after August 1, 1964. Defendant James Park, in 
fact, acknowledged on cross-examination that, in approaching the Carr and Trust 
Properties over the RKR property to the north (for purposes of demonstrating that access 
16 
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to the Trust Property was physically possible over the RKR property - see Paragraph 33, 
below), he had been compelled to trespass. TR at 137. 
22. Mr. Park further acknowledged on cross-examination that he knew of no 
legal avenue of access to the Trust Property from the adjacent county road over properties 
other than the Park Property Easement. TR at 139. 
23. According to testimony of Plaintiff's representative, Mark Hulet, access to 
the trust property over the RKR property, at present, encounters the obstacles for which 
the road across the Park property easement was created - deep washes where earth had 
washed to a depth of three or four feet due to groundwater and spring conditions. TR at 
58-59, and Exhs 3 and 25 pp. 0093-0107. 
24. Other access points across the RKR property to the north encounter 
marshland through which no vehicle can be driven. TR at 60 and Exh. 3. 
25. According to Mr. Hulet, while ATV vehicle travel across the RKR property 
to the Carr and Trust properties is possible, it is "dangerous, because there's drainage 
from that marshland." TR at 60-64 and Exh. 25 at pp. 0101-0109. 
26. Defendants attempted to introduce photographic evidence that a pathway 
across sections of the RKR North Property resulted in a feasible alternative to use of the 
Park Property easement; these photographs, however, omitted sections of the proposed 
road which were impassible due to ground conditions. TR at 159-162, Defendants 
offered no rebuttal when this tactic was exposed. TR at 162. 
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27. Mr. Hulet further testified that access from the west of the Trust property 
encountered steep grades which rendered their use unfeasible. TR at 64-67 and Exhs. 3 
and 25, pp. 0112-0115. 
28. In attempting to access the Trust property from the south, Mr. Hulet 
encountered a locked gate below an unimproved switchback road, portions of which 
washed out over time, over property known as "North Fork Estates". TR at 68-72 and 
Exh. 3. (As noted at Paragraph 27 above, Plaintiff has no right of legal access across any 
property within the North Fork Estates - TR at 72.) 
29. Witness Donald Stucker confirmed at the ATV road through North Fork 
Estates to the Trust Property was infeasible to grade and conditions; further, that a locked 
gate had been installed at its southern end. TR at 120-121, 123. 
30. Witness John Eckert testified that, at sometime in the past, a road had been 
created past a cabin on the RKR North Property, by which the Trust Property was 
accessible; Mr. Eckert acknowledged, however, that RKR had long since barred and 
forbidden access along this road. TR at 147-148. 
31. Mr. Eckert likewise testified that access to the Trust Property had at one 
time been available through property once belonging to Mack Wood, and later to a Dr. 
Martin; Mr. Eckert acknowledged, however, that logging operations of adjacent 
properties have rendered this road completely unusable. TR at 148-149, 153-154. In 
addition, Mr. Eckert testified that Dr. Martin had barred access across his property. TR at 
149-150. 
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C. Marshaling of Evidence. 
1. The RKR North Deed (Exh. 27) contains a reservation of easement in the 
following words: 
Subject to a 30 foot right-of-way from the Kane County Road to the NW 
corner of the N V2 half of the SW %, Section 19, Township 38 S, Range 
8W. 
2. Witness Donald Stucker testified of the existence and one-time usability of 
a road to the Trust Property through North Fork Estates. TR at 120-123 (see, however, 
Paragraph 29, above). 
3. John Eckert testified of additional roads to the Trust Property across the 
RKR North Property, which were later blocked. TR at 148-154. 
4. Defendant James Park testified that, when he purchased the Park Property 
in 2001, he found the road across the Park Property Easement in existence, but impassible 
- that he had to cut down trees in the summer of 2001-2002 to make the road passable. 
TR at 101-103. 
5. Trust representative S. Mark Hulet confirmed Mr. Stucker5s testimony that 
the ATV switchback road up from North Fork Estates had become impassible except by 
ATV. TR at 68-72. 
6. The roadway crossing the Park Property Easement has not been graded or 
improved all the way to the Trust Property, and would require additional engineering and 
grading work. TR at 92-94. (It was undisputed, though, that the existing road extended 
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to the edge of Plaintiff s stipulated easement across the Carr Property - TR at 53-58 and 
Exh.25, pages 0087-0105. 
7. Defendant Park testified that, on one day, he had travelled across the RKR 
North Property from a point north of the junction between County Road K 2000 and the 
Park Property Easement to a point on the Carr Property Easement, and presented 
photographs of portions of the route. TR at 129-135 and Exhs. 28-43. (But see 
Paragraph 26, above.) 
8. No witness at trial testified as to the necessity of an access easement 
between the Trust Property and the adjacent county road on August 1, 1964, there being 
no living individual available to so testify. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court improperly concluded that Plaintiffs motion for new trial, served 
and filed on May 3, 2010, was untimely. The motion was filed on the first business day 
following the tenth calendar day after the Court's ruling of Wednesday, April 21, 2010. 
Even if the Court's date stamp of May 5, rather than the service date of May 3, is used, 
the filing was timely given the exclusion, under Rule 6, Utah R. Civ. P., of intervening 
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. Accordingly, the Court improperly declined to 
consider Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on timeliness grounds. By the same token, 
Plaintiffs appeal from the Court's denial of January 3, 2011 was timely. 
Unrefuted evidence at trial clearly made out the elements of Plaintiff s claim for 
easement by necessity. The evidence established common ownership of the Trust 
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Property and the properties lying to the east thereof under unity of title, followed by 
severance of that unity; also, the existence of reasonable necessity of an easement in 
order to obtain access between the Trust Property and the outside world. The trial court's 
ruling improperly imposed the additional requirement that the necessity exist at the 
instant of severance - a fact to which no living witness was in a position to give 
testimony. The law does not require such a time snapshot, however. 
The trial court also improperly relied upon implications arising from language in 
the deed to the RKR North Property, holding (without evidentiary support) that the 
language evinced an "intent55 to create an express easement between the Trust Property 
and the county road over adjacent land. The reservation of easement contained in the 
RKR North Deed, however, did not constitute an express conveyance of easement to 
Plaintiff or its predecessors in interest, but only the reservation of such rights to the 
grantors. .No companion conveyance, sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, gave rise 
to the conveyance of any express easement in favor of the Trust Property over the RKR 
North Property. 
Finally, the Court should have recognized, from the face of conveyances before it, 
that a reservation of easement had been placed on the RKR North Deed by mistake. On 
that document, the reservation of easement served no purpose, that the RKR North 
Property already flanked the adjacent county road. Accordingly, reformation of 
subsequent deeds to preserve the intended easement on the properties meant to be crossed 
thereby was in order. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
UNTIMELY. 
In its Order of January 3, 2011^ denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 739-
741), the trial court refused to reach the merits of Plaintiff s Motion at all, holding instead 
that: 
In this case the motion for new trial was filed more than ten days after the 
entry of judgment. Under Utah Supreme Court's holding in Burgers [v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982)], this Court's only alternative is 
to deny the motion. 
Order of January 3, 2011, at p. 2 (R. 740; Appendix at Attachment 3). The Court's ruling 
in this regard is unsustainable, and unexplainable. 
As noted in the statement of the case, above, this Court entered judgment in this 
matter on Wednesday, April 21, 2010 (R. 647-650). Ten calendar days following that 
ruling was Saturday, May 1, 2010. Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial, while date-stamped 
at the Sixth District Court in Kanab, Utah, on May 5, 2010, was in fact mailed to the 
Court and opposing counsel on Monday, May 3, 2010 (R. 651-653). 
Under Rule 59(b), Utah R. Civ. P., "a motion for a new trial shall be served not 
later than ten days after the entry of judgment." Given that the judgment in this matter 
was entered on Wednesday, April 21, 2010, the tenth calendar date following entry was 
Saturday, May 1, 2010. Pursuant to Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P., the last day of any filing 
period provided by the rules is to be counted in the computation of the period "unless it is 
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of 
22 
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the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday." Even if strict calendar 
days are used, therefore, Plaintiff had until the following Monday, May 3, 2010, in which 
to file his motion. It was on this day that the motion was sent and served on the Court 
and opposing counsel - see R. 651-653. As noted in the case of Burgers v. Maiben, 652 
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982): 
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b), a party must serve a motion for 
a new trial on the opposing party within ten days from the entry of 
judgment. 
(Emphasis added.) As service upon the opposing party is effective upon mailing {see 
Rule 5(b)(1)(B), Utah R. Civ. P.), service of Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial in this 
matter was complete on May 3, 2010 - the first business day following the tenth calendar 
day after entry of judgment. 
Even if the Court's date-stamped filing date of May 5, 2010 is used, however, the 
filing was timely. This is because, under Rule 6(a), Utah R. Civ. P., 
When the period of time prescribed or allowed, without reference to any 
additional time under subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate 
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the 
computation. 
If weekends and holidays between April 21, 2010 and May 5, 2010 are excluded from the 
computation, May 5th was the tenth day following entry of judgment. The Utah Supreme 
Court has expressly applied the language from Rule 6(a), quoted above, to appeal 
deadlines. In the case of Low v. City ofMonticello} 2002 UT 90, 54 P.3d 1153, the City 
of Monticello challenged the timeliness of a petition for extraordinary writ filed under 
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-607(4)(a) (which provision also requires the filing of the 
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petition within ten days of a city clerk's refusal to accept a referendum petition). The 
court held that weekends and legal holidays were to be excluded from the ten-day appeal 
period, thus making the petitioner's filing timely - 2002 UT 90 at ^ J18. 
Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial in this matter was served on opposing counsel by 
mailing on May 3, 2010; it was filed with the Court on May 5, 2010. If intervening 
weekends are excluded from the ten-day period under Rule 59, either filing date is within 
the ten days mandated thereby. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously and improperly 
found Plaintiffs filing untimely. For the same reason, Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal to this 
Court was timely under Rule 4(b)(1)(D), Utah R. App. P., having come within 30 days of 
the trial court's disposition of Plaintiff s Motion for New Trial. 
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED (YET THE COURT 
FAILED TO FIND) THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A 
LEGAL RIGHT OF ACCESS BETWEEN THE TRUST 
PROPERTY AND THE ADJACENT COUNTY ROAD 
AT THE TIME OF SEVERANCE, OR THEREAFTER. 
The doctrine of easement by necessity was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 277 
(Utah 1976). Therein, the Court stated that "...a way of necessity arises when there is a 
conveyance of a part of a tract of land which is so situated that either the part conveyed or 
the part retained is surrounded with no access to a road to the outer world" (555 P. 2d at 
280). The Tschaggeny decision was cited and upheld by the Utah Court of Appeals in the 
case of Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App. 95 at If 18, 977 P.2d 533, 538. 
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Tschaggeny made clear that an easement by necessity was established by the 
existence of two factors: "(1) Unity of title, followed by severance; [and (2)] That the 
easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate..." (555 P. 2d at 
280). Two additional requirements exist for the creation of an easement by implication 
(that the servitude be "apparent, obvious and visible" at the time of severance, and that it 
be "continuous and self-acting"); these, however, were expressly held unnecessary to the 
creation of a way of necessity. 
Evidence at trial in this matter established the two requisite elements beyond 
doubt. The Trust Property was, prior to August of 1964, held in unity of title with the 
Park Property. Absent an easement of necessity, the owner of the Trust Property has no 
reasonable legal access therefrom to the outer world. The trial court needed to conduct 
no further inquiry than this. Yet the trial court, while apparently recognizing (at least 
implicitly) the truth of both these facts, imposed additional requirements, and imputed 
relevance to irrelevant facts, to leave the Trust Property completely landlocked and 
useless. 
A. Undisputed Evidence Established the Lack of a Legal Means of Access to the 
Trust Property, Rendering the Presence or Absence of Physical Access 
Irrelevant 
The undisputed evidence presented prior to and during trial was that all relevant 
properties in this action were held in unity of title by Bertrand and Idona Smith until 
August 1, 1964. On that date, by simultaneous conveyances, title from the North 
Property was conveyed to RKR Construction Company, while the Trust Property 
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(together with the Carr Property and the Watson Property) were conveyed to Gary Smith, 
Gary Watson and Oliver LeFevre, Smiths retaining title to the Park Property. 
Contrary to its Findings and Conclusions, the Court was presented not only with 
competent, but uncontroverted, evidence that, from that time forward, there was no legal 
right of access between the Trust Property, the Watson Property or the Carr Property and 
the adjacent county road. Not until 1970 did any such legal right of access pass from 
Idona Smith (as the surviving common grantor) to Bud Allen (then owner of the Carr 
Property) - but that right of access was limited to Mr. Allen and his family members. All 
routes identified in testimony presented by the Park Defendants, whether or not 
physically passable, were not legally permissible, according to the undisputed testimony 
of Mark Hulet, who had searched the record and established that no legal right of access 
existed of record between the Trust Property and the adjacent county road after August 1, 
1964. Without exception, the alternate routes between the Trust Property and the 
adjacent county road, listed at f 18 of the Court's Findings, were trespassory to the rights 
of the respective landowners, and illegal. 
It is established law that u[a]n easement by necessity is not defeated by the 
grantee's ability to access a public road over a stranger's property" - see The Fitzgerald 
Living Trust v. United States, 460 F. 3d 1259, 1266 (9th Cir. 2006). Indeed, in other 
jurisdictions, the doctrine of easement by necessity has been articulated as arising "by 
operation of law when part of a commonly-owned tract of land is severed in a way that 
renders either portion of the property inaccessible except by passing over the other 
cmi7i i 
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portion or by trespassing on the lands of another" - Fike v. Shelton, 860 So. 2d 
1227,1230 (Ct. App. Miss. 2003). Even where an alternate access route is used by 
permission, it does not constitute a legal right of access and cannot defeat a way of 
necessity - Spier v. Brewer, 958 S.W. 2d 83 (Ct. App. Mo. 1997). 
From August 1, 1964, then, owners of the Trust Property were barred on all sides 
from accessing their property from the county road without committing trespass. This 
fact appears from the trial record, and nothing offered by Defendants refutes it. 
B. Governing Case Law Does Not Mandate Proof That the Necessity Existed at 
the Moment of Severance of Title, Even Though Plaintiff's Proof Established 
This Fact 
In its Findings and Conclusions, the Court focused on the absence of testimony, by 
any witness at trial, concerning whether there was physical access to and from the Trust 
Property at the moment of severance of title in August of 1964, the Court noting 
(correctly) that Plaintiff had been unable to locate or produce a still-living witness who 
could speak to this issue. Any reliance placed by the Court on this lack of evidence, 
however, ignores two salient points. 
First, there is no requirement in governing case law that a party seeking the 
establishment of an easement by necessity produce eye witnesses who can recreate a 
"snap shot55 of the physical accessibility of the severed property at the instant that title is 
severed. Defendants produced no case law imposing such a requirement - and indeed, 
did not even address it in their trial memorandum, counsel merely arguing the point 
during the course of trial. 
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In fact, the law requires only the establishment of unity of title followed by 
severance, and a reasonable necessity of access between the landlocked property and the 
outer world. The Tschaggeny decision makes clear that, in the case of easement by 
necessity (unlike that of easement by implication) the easement need not be shown to 
exist at the time of severance. This is necessarily so, given the nature of the remedy 
being sought. The law has moved beyond the point of requiring indulgence of the fiction 
that the easement existed (or was created) at any given point in time, and implies the 
easement to remedy the reasonable necessity of the landowner, in order to promote the 
beneficial use of the land. This overriding policy was made clear in the related context of 
the applicability of statutes of limitation to claims of easement by necessity (argued by 
Defendants in this case, but apparently disregarded by the Court in its ruling). In the case 
of Lichty v. Sickels, 149 Cal. App. 3d 696, 197 Cal. Rptr. 137 (Ct. App. 4th Dis., Div 1, 
CA 1983), the court refused a statute of limitations claim may be asserted by any remote 
transferee of the dominant property, at any point in time, holding that the policy behind 
statutes of limitation (the avoidance of stale claims) "does not outweigh the policy of 
freeing up land for beneficial use." By analogy, insistence that the claimant seeking a 
way of necessity to and from a landlocked parcel of property should not be put to the task 
of locating and producing still-living witnesses who can speak to the physical means of 
access to and from a long-severed parcel of landlocked property, provided the proof 
establishes the present existence of a reasonable necessity in order to access the property 
in the future. 
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Second, the Court's observations overlook the fact that Plaintiff did establish, 
without challenge, that no legal access point existed at any time after unity of title to the 
Smith Properties was severed on August 1, 1964. The absence of proof concerning 
physical means of access does not override this fact, as any such physical access means 
would have been trespassory in nature. 
In short, Plaintiffs proof established the elements of easement by necessity: 
(1) unity of title followed by severance, and (2) no reasonable means of access between 
the landlocked parcel and an adjacent public road. Based on this alone, the Court should 
have granted an easement by necessity to permit access to the Trust Property from the 
adjacent county road. 
POINT III: THE SUBJECTION OF THE NORTH PROPERTY TO 
AN EASEMENT FROM THE COUNTY ROAD TO ITS 
WESTERN BOUNDARY DOES NOT EVINCE AN 
INTENT BY THE GRANTORS TO RESERVE AN 
EXPRESS EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF THE TRUST 
PROPERTY. 
The Trial Court's second Conclusion of Law concerning Plaintiffs claim of 
easement by necessity invokes language from the Tschaggeny decision to the effect that 
the creation of an easement by necessity may be defeated by evidence of a contrary intent 
in the common grantor. In its Findings of Fact, the Court noted that, on the same day that 
it conveyed the property which would become the Watson Property, the Trust Property 
and the Carr Property (by Deed 396, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, referred to by the Court's 
ruling as "Deed A"), Smiths also conveyed the North Property (by Deed 00030, 
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Plaintiffs Exhibit 27, which the Court referred to as "Deed B"), and which contained the 
following language: 
The above property is subject to a 30-foot right-of-way from the Kane 
County Road to the NW corner of the N lA of the SW %, Section 19, 
Township 38S, Range 8W. 
The Court concluded, at paragraph 4(B) of its Conclusions of Law, that the presence of 
this language in the deed to the North Property somehow evidenced an intent by Smiths 
to convey an easement over the RKR North Property to Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, 
which defeats Plaintiffs claim of easement by necessity across the Park Property. With 
respect, it is submitted that the Court has confused both the property as benefitted and 
burdened by the language on Deed 396, and the distinction between easements by 
necessity and express easements. 
A. The Trial Court Misstated the Property Burdened by the Reservation of 
Easement 
First, the Court found that the reservation easement on Deed 00396 (Deed "B") 
evinced an intent by Smiths to grant access to and from the County Road to all portions 
of the property granted by Deed "B" - yet the property from which Plaintiff derives its 
title to the Trust Property was included in the property conveyed by Deed 00030 (Deed 
"A" in the Courf s analysis). The Court's observation that Deed "B" ' evidences clear 
intent on the part of the parties to the severance that the express easement granted in 
Deed "B" was the intended means of access to the 80-acre parcel conveyed in Deed "B" 
confers no benefit - express, implied, constructive or otherwise - on the Trust Property, 
which was not conveyed by Deed "B." 
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B. The Reservation of Easement Rights on Deed B Conveyed No Express 
Easement Rights to the Transferees Under Deed A, Nor Did It Express An 
Intent to Do So. 
Even if it was the Court's intent to hold that the easement language contained in 
Deed "B" was intended by Smiths to grant access to the owners and transferees of 
property conveyed by Deed "A," such finding would of necessity entail the conclusion 
that the reservation language on Deed "B" constituted an express grant of easement for 
the benefit of the property conveyed by Deed "A." In other words, the Court attempted, 
in its Findings and Conclusions, to invoke the "intent55 exception mentioned in the 
Tschaggeny decision, not by finding that Smiths intended to land lock the Trust Property 
at the time title to the Smith Properties was severed, but by implying that they intended to 
create an express easement over other property, for the benefit of the Trust Property (as 
well as the Watson and Carr Properties), by inclusion, in Deed "B,55 of the easement 
reservation language. To find such an intent from the face of the instrument alone, 
however, the Court needs to establish that the easement language used by Smiths on 
Deed "B" was in fact legally sufficient to convey an express easement for the benefit of 
the property conveyed by Deed "A55 - which, under governing law, it simply was not. 
Utah law clearly mandates that an express easement - like any other interest in 
real property - must be conveyed by a deed sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. See 
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App. 256, 97 P.3d 
697; Hart v. Schimmelpfennig, 2009 UT App. 27, 2009 WL 271230; Potter v. Chadaz, 
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1999 UT App. 95, 977 P.2d 533. Utah's Statute of Frauds, relating to the conveyance of 
interests in real property, is set out at Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1: 
No estate or interest in real property . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by an act or operation of lawr, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating the same, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Neither the RKR North Deed (Deed "B" in the Court's ruling) nor the RKR Deed 
(Deed "A" in the Court's ruling) granted or conveyed to any transferee any easement 
rights in either property. The language contained in the RKR North Deed (Deed "B") 
reserved easement rights by making the conveyance subject thereto; the easement rights 
so reserved, however, were not conveyed to the transferees of the RKR Deed (Deed "A"). 
The effect of subjecting property otherwise conveyed to easement rights is to reserve 
such rights in the grantor - not to transfer them to a third party without any separate 
grant. See Martinez v. Wells, 2004 UT App. 43, 88 P.3d 343. Indeed, a reservation of 
easement in a conveyance between two parties is insufficient, as a matter of law, to create 
property rights in a "stranger to the transaction" - see Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App. 
95, 977 P.2d 533("Utah law prohibits parties from expressly creating an easement in a 
land transaction for the benefit of a third party who is not involved in the transaction-i.e., 
a 'stranger to the deed'... The law of real property in Utah.. .is that a grantor may 
'reserve' an interest to itself, but not to a third party." - 1999 UT App. 95 at «|| 12.) As no 
express conveyance of an easement interest across the North Property appears of record 
o m m i 
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between Smiths and Plaintiffs predecessors- in-title to the Trust Property, the statute of 
frauds is not satisfied, and no express easement interest arises. If the trial court could 
have inferred anything from the easement language on Deed "B", therefore, it could infer 
only that Smiths reserved such easement rights to themselves - not that they conveyed, or 
intended to convey, the same to the transferees under Deed "A". 
Indeed, it was this lack of manifest intent to convey a separate easement right 
under the RKR Deed (Deed "A") which prompted Plaintiff to attempt to persuade the 
trial court to reform the two 1964 conveyances, and subsequent conveyances, such that 
the easement rights would appear on the proper document, so that the reservation of 
easement would make some sense. The trial court declined, however, to reform the 
deeds, claiming that Plaintiff had offered no evidence of the grantors' intent (see 
Conclusion of Law No. 6). It is ironic, frankly, that the lower court declined to reform 
the deeds to give effect to the reservation of easement language appearing on the RKR 
North Deed (Deed "B"), citing a lack of evidence of the grantors' intent with respect 
thereto, yet invoked an implication of intent as a means of defeating Plaintiffs claim of 
easement by necessity. 
Absent any expression of intent on Smiths' part to convey an express easement to 
the grantees of the RKR Deed (Exh. 4) to match the reservation of easement rights on the 
RKR North Deed (Exh. 27), the trial court could not properly rely on reservation 
language in an adjacent deed to reflect "intent" to withhold an easement by necessity over 
the Park Property Easement. Such an assumption suggests somehow that, even though 
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no conveyance of an easement right was given, Smiths "intended" that the grantees of the 
RKR have an easement in that location, such that a claim of easement by necessity in 
another location was defeated thereby. This, though, would be the equivalent of a finding 
that Smiths "intended" that Plaintiff have an easement by necessity over the RKR North 
Property - an assumption nowhere reflected in the evidence, and at odds with the 
fundamental law of easements by necessity, which by definition are not created by intent 
or agreement - see Dansie v. Hi Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n, 2004 UT App. 149, 
92 P.3d 162. Given that Plaintiff could not satisfy the statute of frauds and argue creation 
of an express easement, could not persuade the Court to reform the instruments of 
conveyance to establish such an express easement, and could not satisfy the Court 
concerning the propriety of an easement by necessity, its claim seems to have fallen 
through non-existent cracks between the three theories. 
POINT IV: THE DEEDS FROM IDONA SMITH TO HARRISES, 
AND FROM HARRISES TO THE PARK 
DEFENDANTS, SHOULD BE REFORMED TO 
REFLECT THE INTENDED EXISTENCE OF AN 
ACCESS EASEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUST 
PROPERTY AND THE ADJACENT COUNTY ROAD. 
Reformation is a remedy available to a court sitting equity, to correct mistakes in 
deeds and other instruments of conveyance where a preponderance of the evidence 
establishes that the instruments do not reflect the grantor's intent. See generally West 
One Trust Company v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah App. 1993); Haslem v. 
Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27, 30 (Utah 1984); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 155 
(1979). A deed is subject to reformation in the case of mutual mistake by the parties to 
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the transaction, or by ignorance or mistake by one party and corresponding fraud by the 
other party. Panos v. Olsen & Associates Construction, Inc., 2005 UT App. 446 at *f 21, 
123 P.3d 816, 821-822. 
The course of transfers and conveyances appearing of public record in connection 
with the Trust Property, the Carr Property and the Park Property clearly evince an intent, 
on the part of the Smiths and their transferees in 1964 to preserve an easement between 
the county road and the properties conveyed by the 1965 RKR Deed. Contrary to the 
findings of the trial court, moreover, the intent is manifest from the face of the public 
record. 
First, if the Court compares the deed by which Bertrand C. and Idona J. Smith 
conveyed the three properties (Watson, Trust and Carr) to RKR Construction on 
August 1, 1964 ("RKR Deed5', Exh. 4) with the deed executed by the Smiths to RKR 
Construction Company on the same day, conveying property immediately to the north of 
the Trust Property ("RKR North Deed55, Exh. 27), the Court will note that the RKR North 
Deed includes, in addition to the property deeded thereby, the following limitation: 
The above property is subject to a 30-foot right-of-way from the Kane 
County Road to the northwest corner of the north one-half of the southwest 
one-quarter, section 19, township 38S, range 8W. 
An examination of this line indicates that the described 30-foot right-of-way runs from 
the Kane County Road (K2000) along the center section line of section 19 to the western 
edge of that section, where the northwest corner of the property described in the RKR 
Deed meets the southwest comer of the property described in the RKR North Deed - see 
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Exh. 3. While, as drafted, the RKR North Deed is made subject to the described right-of-
way, nothing in the RKR Deed (or in any subsequent conveyance of the property 
described therein) gives that property benefit of the right-of-way. A review of the two 
deeds side-by-side, in fact, shows that an error was clearly made in the placement of the 
right-of-way description on the RKR North Deed, and that Smiths intended to place the 
right-of-way along the northern border of the property described in the RKR Deed, for 
the benefit of the Watson Property, the Trust Property and the Carr Property. The 
following monikers establish this fact: 
a. Both deeds were prepared and signed on the same day, before the 
same notary; 
b. The right-of-way is described from calls within the southwest 
quarter of Section 19 where the property deed by the RKR Deed is located, rather than 
from the northwest quarter of the section, where the property deeded by the RKR North 
Deed is located; 
c. Access over the southernmost 30 feet of the property described in 
the RKR North deed is impassible; 
d. Most telling, the property described in the RKR Deed is not adjacent 
to County Road K-2000, is landlocked, and has need of a right-of-way to access the 
public road; the property described by the RKR North Deed, by contrast, is adjacent to 
the county road, and requires no access thereto. 
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Second, when the three transferees of the property conveyed by the RKR Deed 
split their respective properties into the Watson Property, the Trust Property and the Can-
Property (Exhs. 6-8), they conveyed reciprocal rights over and across their respective 
parcels of property to the benefit of neighboring landowners, to permit access to the 
county road via the easement crossing the northernmost 30 feet of their respective 
properties. This would hardly have accomplished anything had it been the intent of the 
grantees not to have access from their respective properties to the adjacent county road. 
While (as noted by the trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law -
see Appendix at Attachment 1, p. 10) the parties to the transactions listed above are now 
deceased and cannot testify, the evidence from the documents of record renders the 
conclusion inescapable that, in conveying the RKR Property, Bertrand and Idona Smith 
intended to reserve a right-of-way from that property to the adjacent county road. Its 
subsequent omission from the deeds to Paul and Gina Harris, and from Paul and Gina 
Harris to the Park Defendants, should be rectified by an order of reformation subjecting 
both transfers to an access easement in favor of the Trust Property. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust, through a series of valid and uncontested 
conveyances, took good and marketable title to a property which is completely land 
locked. Its owners cannot get in. They cannot get out. Any access to the property entails 
trespass; ingress or egress over any route other than the existing road across the Park 
Property Easement entails traversing the rugged, native mountain terrain and/or spring-
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soaked marshland. Equity and good conscience dictate that, in order to make profitable 
and beneficial use of its property, Plaintiff be granted a right of access to the outside 
world. This is the essence, purpose and underlying policy of the doctrine of easement by 
necessity. As an alternative, the Court can recognize that the common grantors, Bertrand 
and Idona Smith, intended in 1964 to remedy the lack of access to the property conveyed 
by the RKR Deed, but placed the easement reservation on the wrong document. 
The trial court should have selected one doctrine or the other to permit some 
legal - and physically reasonable - means of access to the Trust Property from the 
adjacent county road. Instead, the trial court implicated the property rights of an entity 
not even before it. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the holding of the trial court should 
be reversed, and that this Court find either the existence of an easement by necessity, or 
an express easement through reformation, across the Park Property Easement. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 2011. A 
JONES WALDO IK5LBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
^ ^ Vincei^C. Hampton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 19th day of April, 2011: 
Michael W. Park 
The Park Firm PC 
315 West Hilton Drive, #4 
St. George, UT 84770 
^ 
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FILED 
KANE COUNTY 
__MAR_ft_S_2mO-
Clerk 
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL 
KANE COUNTY, STATE 
DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH 
THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST, 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, and 
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 060600022 
Judge Marvin D Bagley 
Trial to the court was held in this action on January 26,2010. Plaintiff The Abraham & 
Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, trustee (hereinafter "the Trust") was represented by 
: present; 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. of the law firm of Jones, 
Although trustee Michael Robert Barker was not 
Sylvester Mark Hulet had authority to act on 
Tori L. Park (hereinafter "the Parks") were represented 
Firm P.C. Defendants Dennis Carr and Donette Cad 
y aldo, Holbrook & McDonough PC. 
at trial the parties stipulated that 
behalf cjf the Trust. Defendants James M. Park and 
stipulated with the Trust for entry of a decree resolving 
Carrs. An Order of Quiet Title and Dismissal based < 
David L. Mower on October 6, 2006 dismissing the 
The court having heard the evidence presentejd and the arguments of counsel and being 
1 
by Michael W. Park, Esq. of The Park 
(hereinafter "the Carrs") previously 
 all issues between the Trust and the 
bn the stipulation was entered by Judge 
Carrs from this action. 
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fully advised NOW ENTERS the following Findings 
FINDINGS OF 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FACT 
1. This is an action brought by the Trust seeking a decree declaring that it is the owner of 
a right of way easement for ingress and egress across real property owned by the Parks located on 
Cedar Mountain in Kane County, Utah. At trial the Trust asserted four legal theories to support 
its claims: (1) easement by necessity, (2) easement by 
and (4) reformation of a deed to establish an express pasement. 
2. Prior to August 1, 1964 Bertrand C. Smith! and Idona J. Smith (hereinafter "the 
Smiths") owned a large parcel of real property (approximately 274 acres) located on Cedar 
Mountain in Kane County Utah in Section 19, Township 38 South, Range 8 West. 
3. Although no conveyance document was introduced into evidence to establish this fact 
the parties acknowledged, when questioned by the cojurt, that prior to August 1,1964 the Smiths 
owned their property as a single parcel. 
4. The Smiths accessed their parcel of propeijty via a county road that bordered and 
passed through portions of their property. 
5. On August 1, 1964 the Smiths conveyed t ie majority of that real property to R-K-R 
Construction Company (hereinafter "RKR") by executing and delivering two warranty deeds. 
One of the two deeds, which was recorded as Entry Mo. 00396 (hereinafter referred to herein as 
Deed "A"), conveyed approximately 80 acres using the following legal description: 
implication, (3) easement by prescription, 
2 
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N Vi of the SW 1/4 Section 19, Township 38 
and Meridian, Kane County, Utah together 
Award No. 34 Virgin River Decree, entered 
James Smith and from ditch No 1. 
$outh, Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base 
0625 Second Feet of water from 
gust 21,1926, in the name of 
wikh 
Au 
The other deed recorded with Entry No. 00030 (which will hereinafter be referred to herein as 
Deed "B") conveyed approximately 240 acres to RKR using the following legal description: 
NW 1/4, W V2 of the NE 1/4 Section 19, Towiiship 
Lake Base and Meridian Kane County, Utah to 
water from Award No. 34, Virgin River Decree, 
name of James Smith from ditch No.l. 
The above property is subject to a '30 foot rig 
Road to the NW corner of the Nl/2 of the S W 4 , 
jht of way from the Kane County 
, Section 19, Township 38 S, 
Range 8 W. 
6. The Smiths retained, and did not convey to 
original parcel. The east boundary of the parcel 
The west boundary of the parcel retained by the Smiths 
approximate 80 acre parcel of property conveyed by tjhe 
northern boundary of the parcel retained by the Smith 
of the approximate 240 acre parcel conveyed to RKR] 
Smith's is currently owned by defendants the Parks 
have declared an easement across the northern boun dary. 
will hereafter be referred to as "the Park Property" add is described as follows 
Beginning S 89°51?01M W, 1641.15 ft. along 
corner Section 19, T38S, R8W, SLM; said 
ip 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt 
gether with .1875 Second Feet of 
, entered August 21, 1926, in the 
RKR approximately 34 acres of their 
retained by the Smiths borders the County Road. 
borders the east boundary of the 
Smiths to RKR in Deed "A". The 
s borders a portion of the South boundary 
in Deed "B". The parcel retained by the 
is the property which the Trust seeks to 
. The property retained by the Smiths 
and 
the 1/4 section line for the East 1/4 
point of beginning being P.O.C. on the 
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West boundary of North Fork Estates, Unit #2, radius point of P.O.C. bears S 
65o35'10" E, 430.00 ft.; thence counterclockwise along arc of said curve 122.31 ft. 
to the P.C.C. of a 699.55 ft. radius curve, radilis point bears S 81°53T00" E; thence 
counterclockwise along arc of said curve 110.49 ft.; thence S 0°56,00M E, 345.82 
ft., to the P.C. of a 780.00 ft. radius curve; thence counterclockwise along arc of 
said curve, 237.33 ft.; thence S 18°22W E, 17.20 ft. to the P.C. of a 970.00 ft. 
radius curve; thence clockwise along arc of said curve, 362.58 ft.; thence S 
3°03 W W, 14.20 ft. to the P.C. of a 297.79 ft. radius curve; thence 
counterclockwise along arc of said curve, 163L54 ft. to the P.R.C. of a 740 ft. 
radius curve, radius point bears S 61°35'W; thence clockwise along arc of said 
curve, 64.43 ft.; thence departing said roadway and subdivision boundary S 
89°51'0r W, 1148.37 ft.; thence N l°37f54M W, 1410.06 ft. along the 1/4 section 
line to the center of said section 19; thence N po51'01" E, 1067.99 ft. along the 
11A section line to the point of beginning. Containing 34.113 acres of land. 
7. On the very same day as the conveyances mom the Smiths to RKR (August 1, 1964) 
RKR as Grantor conveyed the same 80 acre parcel (described in Deed "A") to Grantees B. Gary 
Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver D LeFevre in a Warranty Deed recorded as Entry No. 00346. 
8. On or about December 21,1965 Grantees B. Gary Smith, Gary K. Watson and Oliver 
D LeFevre partitioned, by executing deeds among themselves, the approximate 80 acre parcel 
they obtained form RKR. The 80 acre parcel was divided into three approximate equal parcels. 
9. Of the three approximate equal parcels that were divided on or about December 21, 
1965, B. Gary Smith was conveyed the parcel farthest east. That parcel is currently owned by 
defendants the Carrs (and will be referred to hereinafter as "the Carr Property")- The Carr 
Property borders on its east boundary the parcel originally retained by the Smiths which is the 
Park Property. The legal description of the Carr Property is: 
Beginning at the Center of Section 19, townsnip 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt 
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Lake Meridian, and running thence South 1320 
897.2 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence North 
place of beginning, containing 27.19 acres mqre 
10. Of the three approximate equal parcels thjat were divided on or about December 21, 
1965, Oliver D. LeFevre was conveyed the parcel in 
by plaintiff the Trust and is the parcel the Trust seeks! 
parcel will hereafter be referred to as "the Trust Property 
tjhe middle. That parcel is currently owned 
to have benefitted by this action. That 
and is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point South 89°43T West 897.2; 
Township 38 South, Range 8 West, Salt Lake; 
thence South 1320 feet, thence South 89°43? 
feet; thence North 89°43f East 897.2 feet to thfe 
feet from the center of Section 19, 
Base and Meridian, and running 
^es t 897.2 feet; thence North 1320 
place of beginning. 
11. Of the three approximate equal parcels 
1965, Gary K Watson was conveyed the parcel on th^ 
to as "the Watson Property". 
12. The northwest corner of the Watson prop! 
of the southwest 1/4 of Section 19, Township 38 South 
terminus of the express easement described in Deed' 
13. Following partition among themselves 
December 21,1965, B. Gary Smith, Oliver D. LeFevfe 
and among themselves a thirty (30) foot right of way 
northern boundaries of their three respective properties 
14. The Carr Property was subsequently COOT 
feet; thence South 89°43f West 
89°43T East 897.2 feet, to the 
or less. 
that were divided on or about December 21. 
west. That parcel will hereafter be referred 
jsrty is the northwest corner of the north Vi 
, Range 8 West. That corner is the 
B" identified above, 
oft the 80 acre parcel in approximately 
and Gary K. Watson deeded to each other 
easement for ingress and egress along the 
eyed to Bud R. Allen. On or about 
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November 7, 1970 the Smiths and/or their successors in interest executed an Easement and Right 
of Way granting to Bud R. Allen, "his wife, family, heirs, legatees and devisees" a " perpetual 
easement and right of way" over the northern thirty (30) feet of the Park Property. The easement 
recited that it was "[s]ubject to the condition that said Bud R. Allen, his wife, family, heirs, 
legatees and devisees shall use said easement and right of way only for their personal and private 
use and that said grantees also prevent any other person or persons from using said easement and 
right of way unless expressly agreed to by the Grantojrs". The easement benefitted the Aliens 
and/or the Carr Property. 
15. The Parks acquired the Park Property in: 
Harris. 
16. The principals of the Trust acquired the Tjrust Property from the Estate of Oliver D. 
LeFevre in August 1994. 
17. The only direct evidence presented at trial: 
easements or access roads to, from or through any of (the 
action that were created or in existence on August 1, 
approximate 240 acre conveyance from the Smiths to| 
"from the Kane County Road to the NW corner 
38 S, Range 8 W." 
18. The following evidence was presented at 
001 from Paul R. Harris and Gina L. 
relating to the creation or existence of 
parcels of property relevant to this 
11964 is Deed "B'\ Deed "B" declares the 
RKR is subject to an express easement 
of th^Nl/2 of the SW1/4, Section 19, Township 
trial relating to the existence or creation of 
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roads or right of ways at various other times subsequent to August 1,1964 which are relevant to 
1975 
; was 
lfr 
any of the parcels involved in this action: 
a. Donald E. Stucker, who has ownedj 
Park Property and the Trust Property since 
existed a road across the northern boundary o 
Carr Property. He testified it was a two whee 
road was not locked on occasions when he 
on the same location today is in much better 
testified the road only went into the Carr Propjerty 
Trust Property. 
b. Mr. Stucker also testified he is awa|re 
accesses the Trust Property from a road throu« 
directly south of the Trust Property. He testified 
and proceeded north along the boundary of lo 
said the road once was accessible by car but npw 
c. John E. Eckert, a permanent resident 
personal knowledge of roads in the area since|1975 
1979 nobody locked any gates and the roads 
He testified that between 1975 and 1980 therd 
through the RICR property at various location^ 
to the Trust Property. He testified one of the 
the RKR property and traveled in a northwest) 
the RKR property and then looped back 
access roads were accessible from the County] 
his car from his cabin to the Trust Property, 
specifically described which led to the Trust 
d. Mr. Eckert also testified that in 19 
north boundary of the Park Property leading 
road passed through a marsh that was passabl 
times. He testified that a dike across the mar '^ 
in 1977 to 1979 and that construction of the 
1980. (Bud Allen was a prior owner of the 
easement granted by the Smiths and their 
e. Jim Park testified that when he purl 
"dike" which is the road across the north boundary 
but was impassable. He testified he had to cut 
real property in the vicinity of the 
, testified that in 1978 there 
the Park Property that led into the 
drive road and that the gate to the 
there. He said the road that exists 
condition than it was in 1978. He 
and did not extend into the 
of and has driven a road that 
;h North Fork Estates which is 
the road was made by "LeFevre" 
s 5 and 6 of North Fork Estates. He 
is only accessible by ATV. 
of Cedar Mountain testified he has 
He testified that from 1975 to 
the area were open to everyone, 
were three roads that passed 
north of the Trust Propeity that led 
oads passed through the east side of 
tfly direction to the northern part of 
to the Trust propeity. The 
Road. He testified he could drive 
testified access to the road he 
property was later blocked. 
5 there existed a road along the 
the Carr Property. He said the 
£ at times and not passable at other 
h was authorized to be constructed 
was finished by Bud Allen in 
Property and is a grantee of the 
in interest in 1970.) 
phased the Park Property in 2001 the 
of the Park Property existed 
many trees over the summers of 
southwesterly 1 
He 
;tb 
dike 
Ckr 
successors: 
7 
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2001 and 2002 to make the road passable. 
f. Jim Park also testified and showed 
County Road approximately 150 yards north 
westerly through a portion of the RKR property, 
that road that leads in a Southerly direction to 
Property. He testified the two roads are passable 
from the County Road to the northeast comer 
a mile. 
g. Sylvester Mark Hulet testified he 
and has been affiliated with ownership of the 
otherwise since that time. He introduced 
boundary of the Park Property that leads to th^ 
road goes only into the Carr Property and that 
work performed to extend the road from the 
h. Mr. Hulet also testified that he al 
via a road that turns off the County Road just 
passes through the RKR Property. He testified 
the way to the Trust Property because there 
he could not traverse in his vehicle. He also 
"underground springs" that created a marsh 
certain times of the year. 
i. Mr. Hulet also testified that he a 
from the South through the switchback road 
Estates. He said the road had deep ruts and 
pictures of a road that cuts off the 
qf the Park Property and travels 
There is another cut off from 
jthe northeast corner of the Can-
by trucks and that the distance 
|of the Carr Property is two tenths of 
pictures 
uarr' 
19. The court accepts the testimony as stated 
20. To the extent any of the above Findings 
they are so denominated. 
purchased the Trust Property in 1994 
JTrust Property through trusts or 
of the road across the northern 
Carr Property. He testified the 
Itrees would have to be cut and road 
Property to the Trust Property, 
itteijnpted to access the Trust Property 
jiorth of the Park Property and 
he could not drive his vehicle all 
were fallen trees and two washes that 
testified to the existence of 
th|at could not be driven across during 
ttenjipted to access the Trust Property 
passes through North Fork 
only be accessed by ATV. 
that-
could < 
in Paragraph 18(a)-(i) above as fact, 
op Fact are in actuality conclusions of law 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There was no evidence presented at trial as| 
years) of an access across the Park Property leading td> 
claim for easement by prescription were thus not pro^ 
to the existence or long term use (twenty 
the Trust Property. The elements of a 
en. See Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 
8 
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for easement by prescription. 
the roadway ("the dike") across the north of 
jarr Property to extend the roadway into the 
to the existence of a roadway leading to the 
152 (Utah 1981). The Trust also conceded at trial it did not have the necessary evidence to 
prevail on its claim for prescriptive easement. Accomingly judgment should be entered in favor 
of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the Trust's claimj 
2. The evidence presented at trial established) 
the Park Property has been used in the past to enter tike Carr Property. There was no evidence 
presented to establish that the roadway continued through the Carr Property and into the Trust 
Property. Indeed the evidence was to the contrary. Sylvester Mark Hulet testified trees would 
have to be cut and road work performed across the C] 
Trust Property. There was no evidence presented as| 
Trust Property on August 1, 1964. 
An easement by implication requires the easehient to be apparent, obvious and visible at 
the time of severance. See Tschaggeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 
280-81 (Utah 1976). Plaintiff the Trust essentially conceded at the end of trial that it did not 
have evidence of the existence of a roadway across tme Park Property at the time of severance in 
1964. Accordingly judgment should be entered in fajvor of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the 
Trust's claim for easement by implication. 
3. The Trust asserts the right to use the roadway ("the dike") across the northern edge of 
the Park Property pursuant to a claimed right of easement by necessity. The requirements to 
establish an easement by necessity were set forth in tschaggeny, supra, 197 P.2d at 280-81 as 
9 
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follows: 
Ih 
riot: 
[A] way of necessity arises where there is a 
which is so situated that either the part convened 
with no access to a road to the outer world, 
grant or reservation of a way across the part 
appears that the parties to the conveyance did] 
However, it is not necessary that the easement 
There is no implied grant where the instrument 
provides for a way over the parcel not land lopked, 
conveyance of part of a tract of land 
or the part retained is surrounded 
either case, there is an implied 
so surrounded unless it clearly 
not intend such an easement, 
be visible, apparent, or obvious, 
of conveyance specifically 
4. Under the law set forth in Tschaggeny the 
necessity over the Park Property for the following reisons 
r
 necessity 
Trust is not entitled to an easement by 
a. To establish an easement by 
conveyed following the severance must be 
the outer world". IcL No witness testified as 
1, 1964; the date of severance. The court is 
road from the Trust Property to the outer worl 
no witness with knowledge or other evidence! 
the conditions on the ground forty five years 
the Park Property from the property it sold to 
finding as to whether the eighty acre parcel 
the Trust Property is a part) was landlocked 
Trust is the plaintiff in this action it bears the 
such evidence this court is required to rule in 
b. Under Utah law an easement by 
"clearly appears that the parties to the 
easement." Id. In this case Deed "B 
from the County road across the 240 acre 
the parcel conveyed in Deed "B". Because at] 
two deeds from the Smiths to RKR (Deed "Af 
1
 There was evidence presented to the court g< 
through the RKR property that led to the Trust 
existed in 1964 and long before. However, in the 
court cannot make such a finding. 
under Utah law the land 
sjirrounded with no access to a road to 
to the conditions existent on August 
ujnaware as to whether there was a 
d as of August 1, 1964. Presumably 
was available to the Trust regarding 
^go; at the time the Smith's severed 
RKR. The court thus cannot make a 
ginally conveyed to RKR (of which 
the time of severance. Because the 
burden of proof. In the absence of 
favor of the Parks on that issue.1 
is not created where it 
did not intend such an 
a grant of a thirty foot easement 
parcel to the northwest comer of 
the time of severance there were 
' and Deed "B") rather than just one; 
on 
aft 
necessity  
conveyance 
contained 
RKR 
oing back to at least 1975 that roads existed 
Property. The court presumes those roads also 
absence of direct evidence on that point the 
10 
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1ft 
and because the land in Deed "B" was on the 
the three individuals (B. Gary Smith, Gary K. 
and because the thirty foot easement granted 
corner of the property conveyed in "Deed "Br 
the part of the parties to the severance that the) 
"B" was the intended means of access to the 
"B". A portion of that parcel is now the Trusl] 
Deed "B" which contains the express 
parties to the original severance did not inten4 
across the Park Property; but rather an 
c. The existence of the express thirty 
County Road across the RKR Property to the 
Property (which also benefits and gives accesi 
results in the conclusion that the Trust Property 
landlocked at the time of severance. Under 
its very nature, only comes into existence 
easement 
pme day subsequently conveyed to 
Watson and Oliver D. LeFevre); 
Deed "B" went to the northwest 
I, Deed "B" evidences clear intent on 
express easement granted in "Deed 
fighty acre parcel conveyed in Deed 
Property. 
^asement clearly demonstrates the 
the reservation of an easement 
across the larger RKR parcel, 
foot right of way easement from the 
jiorthwest corner of the Watson 
to the Trust Property) necessarily 
is not landlocked and was not 
law an easement by necessity, by 
severed property is landlocked. 
Utah 
if the 
5. The Trust asserts the need to cross the nortlhern portion of the Park Property because 
However, the court has been cited to no case 
an< 
legal • 
easement 
routes across the RKR Property are "impassable5 
law or other authority suggesting the conveyance of 
an easement by necessity) guarantees more than a " 
grantee can grant an express right of way easement 
a passable road. Indeed for the creation of an 
easement be visible, apparent, or obvious". Id at 28(1) 
In addition there was ample evidence presented 
establishing the fact the Trust Property is accessible 
Property. In addition, at the time of severance, the r 
was not even in existence. The dike was first authorized 
express easement (or even the creation of 
righf'of access. Under Utah law a 
wlithout an accompanying legal duty to build 
by necessity "it is not necessary that the 
81. 
*y 
at trial of which this court accepts 
more than one route across the RKR 
ojadway ("the dike") across the Park Property 
in 1977 to 1979 and was constructed in 
11 
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1980. Crossing the Park Property would have been just as impassable at the time of severance as 
crossing the RKR Property is today. A roadway, if needed, can be constructed across the RKR 
property just the same as the road across the Park Property was constructed. 
Moreover this court finds, based on the testimony of Jim Park, that a road currently exists 
tluough the RKR property that leads to the Carr Property and ends in the very same location that 
the road across the northern boundary of the Park Property leads; which is the road the Trust 
seeks to access. 
Accordingly judgment should be entered in faj^ or of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the 
Trust's claim for easement by necessity. 
6. The Trust claims the insertion of the described 
RKR Property in Deed "B" was a mistake; and that 
created in favor of the Trust's predecessors in interest] 
reformation of the deed to create such an easement, 
express thirty foot easement across the 
iristead an easement was intended to be 
assertion for the following reasons: (1) there was no 
the original grantor; (2) the express wording of Deed 
predecessors and successors in interest; (3) there was 
document executed at the time of severance in which 
there are no facts to suggest an easement across the: 
more preferable to the original grantor and grantees * 
across the Park Property. The Trust seeks 
"the court does not accept the Trust's 
ejvidence presented at trial as to the intent of 
'B" actually benefits the Trust and its 
Ino other deed or other conveyance 
to insert a different easement grant; and (4) 
north of the Park Property would have been 
tljian an easement across the RKR Property. 
12 
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This court concludes based on all of the evidence 
easement time of severance intended to grant an express 
easement benefits plaintiff the Trust and the Trust 
Trust's express easement across the Watson Property 
and its predecessors and successors in interest the 1 
the County Road and through the RKR Property.3 
The Trust also alleges that in the interest 
presented that the original parties at the 
across the RKR Property.2 That 
Prcjperty. That easement together with the 
|and the Carr Property grants to the Trust 
right to access the Trust Property from legal 
ofpiibl: 
the Trust should be allowed to use the existing road; 
to construct or improve another route. Accepting sucft 
Trust and may or may not benefit the public in general 
the Parks' protected private property rights. 
Accordingly judgment should be entered in faVor of defendants the Parks on plaintiff the 
Trust's claim for express easement by reformation of Ideed. 
7. To the extent any of the above Conclusion^ of Law are in actuality findings of fact 
"There was no evidence the Smiths intended 
Property) at the time of severance. If such were their 
the easement subsequently granted to Bud R. Allen. 
the 3At trial the Trust asserted its contention that 
easement across the RKR Propeity passes directly alojn] 
which abuts the northern borders of the Park Property 
the Watson Property. Although it appears incontrovertible 
Property in favor of the Trust, the exact location of thjat 
proceeding. 
ic policy, conservation and saving money 
across the Park Property rather than having 
argument would no doubt benefit the 
. The result however would contravene 
aft easement across their property (The Park 
intent there would have been no need for 
location of the express thirty foot 
g the southern border of the RKR Property 
[, the Carr Property, the Trust Property and 
an easement exists across the RKR 
easement is a subject for a different legal 
13 
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they are so denominated. 
8. Mr. Michael W. Park is assigned to prepar^ 
based upon these Findings of Fact and Conclusions o 
DATED this _6_ day of Mardh 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Findings 
to the following on the 
_g_day of March 2010. 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES WALDO HOLBOOK & 
MCDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
an appropriate Judgment and Decree 
Law and submit to the court for signature. 
2010. 
^ N T ^ 
MARVIN D BAGLEY 
District Court Judge 
of fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed 
Michael W. Park 
THE PARK FIRM PC 
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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Michael W.Park (2516) 
THE PARK FIRM, P.C. 
315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-8689 
Facsimile: (435) 673*8767 
Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060600022 
Judge: Marvin D. Bagley 
The above entitled matter was tried by the Court on January 26,2010. The 
Abraham & Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, trustee (hereafter "the Trust") was 
represented by Vincent C. Rampton, of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
Judgment Page! 
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MAY. 5.2010 10:55AM "P MRK FIRM NO. 906 P. 3 
McDotiough PC. Although trustee Michael Robert Barker was not present at trial, the 
parties stipulated that Sylvester Mark Hulet had authority to act on behalf of the Trust. 
Defendants James M. Park and Tori L. Park (hereafter "the Parks") were represented by 
Michael W. Park, of The Park Firm, P.C. Defendants Dennis Carr and Donette Carr 
(hereafter "the Carrs") previously stipulated with,the Trust for entry of a decree resolving 
all issues between the Trust and the Carrs. An Order of Quiet Title and Dismissal based 
on the stipulation was entered by Judge David L. Mower on October 6,2006, dismissing 
the Carrs from this action. 
The Court having heard the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises and having made its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, now makes the following judgment. 
1. The Trust's claim for a prescriptive easement across the Parks property is 
denied and judgment is entered in favor on the defendants, the Parks, and against the 
Trust on the Trust's claim for easement by prescription. 
2. The Trust's claim for an easement by implication across the Parks property 
is denied and judgment is entered in favor of the defendants, the Parks, and against the 
Trust on the Trust's claim for easement by implication. 
3. The Trust's claim for an easement by necessity across the Paries property is 
lag—ai—BBgea— m w w w I D » M ^ « — — n ^ » ^ ^ 
Judgment Page 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\r -J i V W i w. •«• 
MAY. 5 . 2 0 1 0 10:55AM T, ?ARK F I ! NU. yu D r. <\ 
denied, and judgment is entered in favor of defendants, the Parks, and against the Trust 
on the Trust claim for easement by necessity. 
4. The Trust's claim for reformation of the deed, to establish an express 
easement across the Parks property, is denied and judgment should be entered in favor of 
the defendants, the Parks, and against the Trust on the Trust's claim for reformation of 
deed to grant an express easement across the Parks property, 
DATED t h i s ^ \ V day of [ ^ ^ A , 2010, 
WBSBSBm 
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FACSIMILE & MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the j ^ f f l ay of April, 2010,1, by facsimile, sent a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT, and also mailed said Judgment, first class, 
postage prepaid, by U.S. mail to the following attorney, who was notified that this 
Judgment had not been submitted to the Court and will be held for eight (8) days to 
determine if there is an objection to the form of the Judgment. If no objection is received 
within eight (8) days from the date of mailing, the Judgment will be submitted to the 
Court for signature. 
Vincent C. Rampton 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &. MCDONOUGH, PC 
170 S Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Fax: 801-328-0537 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST, ; 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee, ; 
Plaintiff, . ; 
vs.
 > 
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, and ; 
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR, ; 
Defendants. ' 
> ORDER DENYING 
I MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
) Civil No. 060600022 
) Judge Marvin D Bagley 
A final Judgment was entered by the court in this case on April 21,2010; following a trial 
to the court held on January 26,2010. On May 5,2010 plaintiff The Abraham & Associates 
Trust filed a Motion For New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 (a)(7) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and the motion was argued to the court on 
November 4,2010. Following the hearing the court took the motion under advisement. 
Rule 59(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: "A motion for a new trial shall be served 
not later that 10 days after the entry of the judgment." The terms of the rule are mandatory and 
jurisdictional. In Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320,1321 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 59(b), a party must serve a motion for a new trial on 
the opposing party within 10 days from the entry of the judgment. The serving of 
such a motion suspends from running the one-month period in which a party 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
usually has to file a notice of appeal with this Court pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
73(a). After disposition of a timely motion for a new trial, the time for filing a 
notice of appeal resumes running. 
In the present case, 25 days passed after entry of the final judgment before the 
defendant served a copy of his motion for a new trial and a supporting affidavit on 
the plaintiffs. When such an untimely motion is made, the trial court's only 
alternative is to deny the motion, Hulson v. Atchison T. & S.R Railway Co., 289 
F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1961), which the trial court did in this case. See also, Holbrook 
v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120,466 P.2d 843 (1970). (Emphasis added). 
In this case the Motion for New Trial was filed more than ten days after the entry of 
Judgment. Under the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Burgers this court's only alternative is to 
deny the motion. 
Accordingly plaintiff s Motion for New Trial is denied. 
# 
fc-
DATED thisSU day of December 2010. 
J2±s± 
tRVIN D B7CGLEY 
District Court Judge 
a 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion for New Trial was mailed to 
the following on the £ day of ©eeemfeer 201 $. 
~^~ Jm 
Vincent C. Rampton Michael W. Park 
JONES WALDO HOLBOOK & THE PARK FIRM PC 
MCDONOUGH PC 315 West Hilton Drive, Suite 4 
Attorneys for Plaintiff St. George, Utah 84770 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Fax: (801)328-0537 
Email: vrampton@joneswaldo.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff' 
m THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST, 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, arid 
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR, 
individuals, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
"" \ Civil No. 060600022 
Judge Marvin D. Bagley 
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, Trustee, hereby appeals to 
the Utah Supreme Court from the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
May 8, 2010; the trial court's Judgment entered April 21, 2010; and the trial court's Order 
Denying Motion for New Trial entered December 30, 2010, in the above-entitled action. 
DATED this K 1 ^ day of January, 2011. 
o HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Fl? r^in 
» a i»v ,^ ii^g, &&, 
KANE COUNTY 
JAN 0 7 Z011 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following th i sV^^ day of 
January, 2011: 
Michael W. Park 
The Park Firm PC 
315 West Hilton Drive, #4 
St. George, UT 84770 
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Vincent C. Rampton (USB 2684) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Fax: (801)328-0537 
Email: vrampton@ioneswaldo.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE ABRAHAM & ASSOCIATES TRUST, 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, Trustee, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES M. PARK AND TORI L. PARK, and 
DENNIS CARR AND DONETTE CARR, 
individuals, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 060600022 
1 Judge Marvin D. Bagley 
Plaintiff Abraham & Associates Trust, Michael Robert Barker, Trustee, hereby appeals to 
the Utah Supreme Court from the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated 
March 8, 2010; the trial court's Judgment entered April 21, 2010; and the trial court's Order 
Denying Motion for New Trial entered December 30, 2010, in the above-entitled action. This 
Amended Notice of Appeal supersedes the Notice of Appeal filed January 4, 2011 herein, which 
erroneously stated that the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein were 
entered May 8, 2011. 
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DATED this 24th day of January, 2011. 
JONES WALDO HOLBBTOOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By: 
*Vmcent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
960063vl 
17419.0001 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended 
Notice of Appeal was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 24th day 
of January, 2011: 
Michael W. Park 
The Park Firm PC 
315 West Hilton Drive, #4 
St. George, UT 84770 
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